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WALSH V. WALSH.

[18 C. (2d)

App. 378, 386, 387 [9 Pac. (2d) 225], as follows: "It is a
settled rule that when the language employed is fairly susceptible of either one of two constructions contended for
without doing violence to its usual and ordinary import an
ambiguity arises where extrinsic evidence may be resorted to
for the purpose of explaining the intention of the parties, and
that for this purpose conversations Q,etween and declarations
of the parties during the negotiations at and before the execution of the contract may be shown (Balfour v. Fresno O. & 1.
00., 109 Cal. 221 [41 Pac. 876]). n [5] And in Scott v.
Sun-Maid Raisin Growers Assn., 13 Cal. App. (2d) 353 [57
Pac. (2d) 148], the court stated at p. 359: "When the meaning of the language of a contract is uncertain or doubtful and
parol evidence is introduced in aid of its interpretation, the
question of its meaning is one of fact . . . . (Thomson v. Leak,
135 Cal. App. 544, 548 [27 Pac. (2d) 795] ; Gallatin v. Markowitz, 139 Cal. App. 10, 13 [33 Pac. (2d) 424]; Ooats v. General Motors Gorp., 3 Cal. App. (2d) 340, 356 [39 Pac. (2d)
838].) " [Italics added.]
[2b] Applying the rules of law above stated, it is clear
that the trial court should have denied defendant's motion for
a summary judgment so that the issue raised between the
parties hereto as to the duration of defendant's undertaking
to furnish support and maintenance to the plaintiff might be
tried upon its merits. [6] The summary judgment statute is
drastic and its purpose is not to provide a substitute for existing methods in the trial of issues of fact. The use made of
the statute in this case was a perversion and an abuse of it.
For the reasons indicated. the judgment 'of the superior
court is hereby reversed and the cause remanded.
Gibson, C.. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied September 13, 194L
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[L. A. No. 16881. In Bank.-Aug. 19, 1941.]

A.L. KEENER, Appellant, v. NELLIE D. KEENER,
Respondent.
[1] Divorce-Extreme Cruelty-Conduct Causing Mental Suffering.~The inflicting of "grievous mental suffering," within the
meaning of Civ. Code, § 94, is a question of fact to be deduced
from the circumstances of the case, in the light of the intelligence, refinement and dellcacy of sentiment of the complaining
party. A correct decision depends upon the sound sense and
judgment of the trial court whose conclusion will not be
disturbed unless the evidence is so slight as to indicate an
abuse of discretion.
[2] Id.-Extreme Cruelty-Conduct Causing Mental SufferingConduct Indicating Dissatisfaction.~A course of conduct by
which one party to a marriage continually indicates dissatisfaction with the other and makes such dissatisfaction known
to friends of the parties may well cause humiliation, embarrassment and mental anguish to a degree constituting extreme cruelty. And so a spouse's loss of temper, his repeated
criticism of his wife in the presence of friends, his statements,
after years of marriage, that she should support' herself are
sufficient to constitute extreme cruelty wher~ they are proved
to have caused her grievous mental suffering,
[3] Id.-Proceedings-Complaint-Pleading Cruelty.-While Civ.
Code, § 94, defining extreme cruelty requires an element of
wrongfulness, a pleader suing for divorce on such ground need
not use the exact language of the statute. It is' sufficient if
the rational inference from the allegation is that the infliction .of the suffering on the other party was wrongful.
[4] Id.-Extreme Cruelty-Justification-Proof by Complainant.
It is not necessary that a cross-complainant seeking a divorce
on the ground of extreme cruelty establish as a part of her
case her ,own freedom. from fault where the plaintiff in his
answer to the cross-complaint did not allege any fault on her
part, and there was no evidence at the trial indicating that

2. See 9 C~l. Jur. 650; 17 Am. Jur. 188.
McK. Dig. References: 1, 2. Divorce and Separation,§ 13; 3, 5.
Divorce and Separation, § 72 (3) ; 4. Divorce and Separation, § 23;
6. Divorce and Separation, § 25 i 7. Divorce and Separation, § 27;
8. Trial, § 285.
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[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

the cross-complainant was in any way responsible for the
plaintiff's course of conduct.
Id. - Proceedings - Complaint - Pleading Oruelty-Alleging
Time and Place.-A pleader seeking a divorce on the ground
of extreme cruelty need not, in the ,absence of special demurrer, plead the exact time and place of each of the acts
complained of where the conduct was continuous and was
not confined to any particular time or locality.
Id.-Extreme Oruelty-Sufficiency of Evidence-Motive.-One
seeking a divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty need not
prove that the course of conduct complained of was inspired
by malevolent motives.
Id. -Extreme Oruelty - Corroboration - Successive Acts.Where· the cruelty consists of successive acts of ill treatment,
it is not necessary that there be direct testimony of other
witnesses to every act sworn to by the complaining party.
The corroboration is sufficient where the corroborating witness states that he heard the testimony of the party and
knows the facts related therein to be· true.
.
Trial- Findings-Necessity for-Waiver.-Findings of fact
are not required where the. parties join in a written stipulation, filed with the clerk, waiving findings.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Angeles County. Ben B. Lindsey, JUdge. Affirmed.

1.108

Action for divorce in which defendant filed a cross-complaint for separate maintenance which was amended at the
trial by adding a prayer for divorce. Judgment granting a
divorce on the cross-complaint, the complaint having been dismissed, affirmed.
Jerrell Babb for Appellant.
Roy J. Farr for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff filed an action for divorce on the
ground of desertion against defendant to whom he had been
married for over thirty years. Defendant answered and
cross-complained for separate maintenance on the ground of
extreme cruelty. Subsequently plaintiff filed an answer to
defendant's cross-complaint and an amended complaint adding
a second cause of action for divorce on the ground of defendant's alleged extreme cruelty. At the trial defendant amended
her cross-complaint by adding a prayer for divorce. Plainti:tI
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dismissed his complaint and the action was tried on the crosscomplaint of defendant as a default.
Defendant alleged in her cross-complaint as amended that
during the last three years of her married life plaintiff on
numeroUs occasions lost his temper and found fault with defendant in the presence of friends and acted in a· peculiar
manner, that he remarked in the presence of friends that defendant was not a good or proper wife, that he told her she
should get out and support herself, and that he requested her
to apply for work as a kitchen cook or servant. She alleged
that these acts caused her grievous mental anguish.
At the trial defendant testified regarding the acts of the
plaintiff substantially in accord with the allegations of the
amended cross-complaint. She testified that this conduct was
continuous, made her nervous and ill and caused her great
:mental suffering. A corroborating witness testified that she
heard the testimony of defendant, knew the facts therein related and corroborated them in their entirety.
The court granted defendant a divorce upon her crosscomplaint and plaintiff appealed.
[1] Plaintiff contends that the facts alleged and proved
by defendant were insufficient to sustain an action for divorce
on the ground of extreme cruelty. Section 94 of the Civil
Code defines extreme cruelty as "the wrongful infliction of
grievous bodily injury, or grievous mental suffering, upon the
other by one party to the marriage." In each case the infliction of "grievous mental suffering" is a question of fact
to be deduced from the circumstances of the case, in the light
. of the intelligence, refinement and delicacy of sentiment of
the complaining party. (Barnes v. Barnes, 95 Cal. 171 [3·0
Pac. 298, 16 L. R. A. 660] ; Fleming v. Fleming, 95 Cal. 430
[30 Pac. 566, 29 Am. St. Rep. 124] ; MacDonald v. MacDonald, 155 Cal. 665 [102 Pac. 927, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 45];
Avery v. Avery, 148 Cal. 239 [82 Pac. 967] ; Cline v. Cline, 4
Cal. A'pp;(2d) 626 [41 Pac. (2d) 588]; Shaw v. Shaw, 122
Cal. App. i 72 [9 Pac. (2d) 876] ; Davis v. Davis, 58 CaL App.
100, 102 [207 Pac. 923] ; Van Camp v. Van Camp, 53 Cal.
App. 17, 22 [199 Pac. 885].) A corre·ct decision must depend
. upon the sound sense and judgment of the trial court. (Barnes
v. Barnes, supra; Shaw v. Shaw, supra.) Its conclusion will
not be disturbed unless the evidence is so slight as to indicate
an abuse 6f discretion. (MacDonald v. MacDonald, supra;
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Davis v. Davis, supra; Andrews v. Andrews, 120 Cal. 184 [52
Pac. 298J.)
[2] A course of conduct by which one party to the marriage continually indicates dissatisfaction with the other and
makes such dissatisfaction known to friends of the parties
may well cause humiliation, embarrassment and mental anguish to a degree constituting extreme cruelty. In the instant
case plaintiff was a teacher in the public schools and his loss
of temper and repeated criticisms of defendant in the presence
of their friends and his statements, after more than 25 years
of marriage, that she should support herself were sufficient to
constitute extreme cruelty if they prove to have caused her
grievous mental suffering. The trial judge was in a position
to observe the intelligence, refinement and delicacy of sentiment of the defendant and to determine whether plaintiff's
conduct caused her grievous mental suffering. In the absence of. an abuse of discretion, his conclusion cannot be disturbed.
[3] Plaintiff contends that the defendant did not sufficiently allege or prove that his conduct was wrongful. . While
section 94 by its definition of extreme cruelty requires. an
element of wrongfulness, the pleader need not use the exact
language of the statute. It is sufficient if the rational inference from the allegations of the cross-complaint is that the
infliction of the suffering upon the other party was wrongful.
(Nelson v. Nelson, 18 Cal. App. 602 [123 Pac; 1099];McCahanv. McCahan, 47 Cal. App. 176, 180 [190 Pac. 460].)
,[4] It was not necessary that defendant establish as part
of her case her own freedom from fault where plaintiff in his
answer to her cross-complaint did not allege any fault on her
part and there was no evidence at the trial indicating that defendant was in any way responsible for plaintiff's course of
conduct. Plaintiff did not see fit to cross-examine defendant
or to offer any evidence on his own behalf.
[5] It was not necessary that defendant plead the exact
time and place of each of plaintiff's acts, for the conduct of
which she complained was continuous and not confined to any
particular time or locality. (Zartarian v. Zartarian, 47 Cal.
. App. 90 [190 Pac. 196].) Moreover, plaintiff did not see fit.
to demur specially to the amended cross-complaint. [6] Nor
was it necessary that defendant prove that plaintiff's course of
conduct was inspired by malevolent motives. (Barngro'verv.
Barngrover, 57 Cal. App. 43 [206 Pac. 451].)
,
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[7] Plaintiff contends that the corroboration offered by
. defendant was inadequate. Where the cruelty consists of
successive acts of ill-treatment, however, it is not necessary
that there be direct testimony of other witnesses to every act
sworn to by the complaining party. (Andrews v. Andrews,
s'/,(,pra.) Here the corroborating witness stated that she heard
the testimony of the defendant and knew the facts related
therein to be true. No objection to this testimony was made
by the, plaintiff. The corroboration was sufficient.
[8] Plaintiff complains of the failure of the trial court to
make :findings of fact. The parties joined in a written stipulation, filed with the clerk, waiving findings. Under such
circumstances findings are not required. (Code Civ, Pi-oc.,
sec. 632. See Waldecker v. Waldecker, 178 Cal. 566 [174
Pac. 36].)
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., concurred.

[Crim. No. 4343.

In Bank.-Aug. 19, 1941.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. DEWEY CLARK et al., Appellants.
[1] Homicide-Evidence-Evidence of Murder.-In a prosecution

for murder the evidence justified a conviction where it showed
the finding of the defendants a few hours after the disappearance of the murdered couple in unexplained possession of the
automobile in which they were last seen alive, where they
were positively identified by a garageman who saw them after
the. commission of the crime and whose testimony was corroborated by others, where there was testimony of other witnesses to defendants' presence near the scene of the crime
on the evening thereof which was not inherently improbable,
where. there were corroborating circumstances including blood
on. defendants' clothing, and where contradictions in defendants' testimony justified its rejection by the jury.
McK. Dig. References: 1. Homicide, § 145 (3); 2. Witnesses,
§ 23.
18 C. (2d)-15

